# Optimized Threshold Implementations: Minimizing the Latency of Secure Cryptographic Accelerators 

Dušan Božilov, Miroslav Knežević, Ventzislav Nikov

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## Threshold Implementations (TI)

- Boolean masking scheme
- Glitch resistant
- Three key properties
- Correctness
- Non-completeness
- Uniformity
- Two variants
- td + 1
- d + 1

- Number of input shares is always $d+1$, where $d$ is security order
- Number of output shares depends on the algebraic degree $t$ as well, and is lower bound by $(d+1)^{t}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& y=a b \\
& y=\left(a_{0}+a_{1}\right)\left(b_{0}+b_{1}\right) \\
& y_{0}=a_{0} b_{0} \\
& y_{1}=a_{0} b_{1} \\
& y_{2}=a_{1} b_{0} \\
& y_{3}=a_{1} b_{1}
\end{aligned}
$$



## Tl properties

- Tl should preserve the functionality of the operation we are trying to protect (correctness)
- Any input share may appear only once in any given output share

$$
\begin{aligned}
& y_{2}=a_{0} b_{1}+a_{0} \\
& y_{3}=a_{0} b_{2}+a_{-} 1 c_{-} 0
\end{aligned}
$$

- Output should preserve the distribution of the input (Uniformity)
- Mandates registers between non-linear operations
- Requires randomness injection at the end of every non-linear operation if the result is compressed afterward


## S-Box decomposition



## From sharing to table

$$
\begin{aligned}
& y_{0}=a_{0} b_{0}+c_{0} \\
& y_{1}=a_{0} b_{1} \\
& y_{2}=a_{1} b_{0} \\
& y_{3}=a_{1} b_{1}+c_{1}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Rows represent one output share and columns represent input variables
- Values represent allowed input share in the output share of a given variable
- Number of variables is the number of columns in the table


## From table to sharing

$$
\begin{gathered}
c \\
\begin{array}{c}
y=a b+a c+b c \\
\left(\begin{array}{lll}
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 \\
* & 0 & 1 \\
* & 1 & 0
\end{array}\right) \begin{array}{l}
y_{0}=a_{0} b_{0}+a_{0} c_{0}+b_{0} c_{0} \\
y_{1}=a_{0} b_{1}+a_{0} c_{1}+b_{1} c_{1} \\
y_{2}=a_{1} b_{0}+a_{1} c_{0} \\
y_{3}=a_{1} b_{1}+a_{1} c_{1} \\
y_{4}=b_{0} c_{1} \\
y_{5}=b_{1} c_{0}
\end{array}
\end{array} .
\end{gathered}
$$

- Number of shares is higher than the lower bound of $(d+1)^{t}=4$


## From table to sharing

- Table implicitly satisfies the non-completeness property
- However, we need to check for correctness
- For each monomial in the ANF all combinations of its share indices are present

$$
y=a b+a c+b c+a b c
$$

## Table of a $n$-bit function of degree $t$

- Table is optimal if it has the minimum number of rows while still satisfying correctness property
- A table $D$ can be used to share any $n$-bit function of degree $t$ iff every monomial of $t$ input variables can be shared correctly
- For any chosen $t$ columns from $D$ all input share combinations are present
- Optimal sharing is not unique, hence multiple optimal tables exist
- Two tables $D_{1}$ and $D_{2}$ are conjugate if there they are both optimal but they contain no same row between the two of them


## Optimal sharing of a 2-bit function of degree 1 for any order $d$

- Number of rows is $d+1$
- Trivial solution where $i$-th row is equal to $(i, i)$
- We can create $d+1$ conjugate table by rotating the index in the second column


## Optimal sharing of $n$-bit functions of degree n -1 for any order d

- Start from optimal conjugate $d+1$ tables for $n=2$ of degree 1
- Given $d+1$ optimal conjugate tables with $n$ columns for functions of degree $n-1$ construct $d+1$ optimal conjugate tables with $n+1$ columns for functions of degree $n$
- Start from $d+1$ optimal and conjugate tables $D_{0}, \ldots, D_{d}$ with $n$ columns and $(d+1)^{n-1}$ rows
- Obtain tables $T_{0}, \ldots, T_{d}$ with $n+1$ columns and $(d+1)^{n}$ rows
- For $T_{j}$ append a column to $D_{i}$ where each value is equal to $i+j \bmod (d+1)$ and add them as new rows in $T_{j}$


## Example for $n=3$ and $d=2$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& D_{0}=\left(\begin{array}{ll}
0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 \\
2 & 2
\end{array}\right), D_{1}=\left(\begin{array}{ll}
0 & 1 \\
1 & 2 \\
2 & 0
\end{array}\right), \mathrm{D}_{2}=\left(\begin{array}{ll}
0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 \\
2 & 2
\end{array}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

## Application to PRINCE cipher

- We have applied our sharing construction to TI of PRINCE cipher
- S-Box is of degree 3 with 4-bit input
- First and second order implementation
- Compared to the previously known PRINCE TI where S-Box decomposition is used


## DOM-like remasking of first order TI PRINCE

- Obtained shares have complementary domains that can use the same randomness

$$
\left(\begin{array}{llll}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 1
\end{array}\right) \begin{gathered}
+0 \\
+R_{1} \\
+R_{2} \\
+R_{3} \\
+R_{3} \\
+R_{2} \\
+R_{1} \\
+0
\end{gathered}
$$

## Results

- We clearly outperform the previous PRINCE TI implementation with respect to latency
- First order implementation consumes less energy despite higher power consumption

| PRINCE | Area <br> $@ 10 ~ M H z$ <br> $(\mathrm{GE})$ | Power <br> $@ 10 \mathrm{MHz}$ <br> $(\mathrm{uW})$ | Energy <br> $@ 10 \mathrm{MHz}$ <br> $(\mathrm{pJ})$ | Rand/ <br> Cycle <br> $($ bits $)$ | Clock <br> $(\mathrm{cycle})$ | $f_{\max }$ <br> $(\mathrm{MHz})$ | Latency <br> $@$ <br> $f_{\max }$ <br> $(\mathrm{ns})$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unprotected | 3589 | 59 | 71 | 0 | 12 | 393 | 30.5 |
| $[14] 1^{\text {st }}(t d+1)$ <br> with S-box decomp. | 9484 | 66 | 264 | 0 | 40 | 432 | 92.6 |
| $1^{\text {st }}(d+1)$ <br> w/o S-box decomp. | 11596 | 100 | 241 | 48 | 24 | 376 | 63.8 |
| $2^{\text {nd }}(d+1)$ <br> w/o S-box decomp. | 32444 | 374 | 898 | 1728 | 24 | 385 | 62.4 |

## TVLA of first order implementation



## Future work

- Explore other cases where degree of the n -bit function is $\mathrm{n}-2$ or smaller
- Application to other use cases
- Remasking optimization considerations

Thank you!
Questions

